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MS-12-08-348  
Tax Havens and Effective Tax Rates: 
An Analysis of Private versus Public European Firms 
 
Abstract 
We examine the impact of tax-haven operations on the effective corporate tax burdens of 
publicly listed and privately held firms domiciled in Europe. In particular, we consider how 
European firms’ tax haven operations interact with factors such listing status and home-country 
tax reporting systems to determine the relative tax burdens of publicly listed and private firms. 
Our main empirical results show that tax haven operations are associated with lower effective 
tax rates for both private and public firms, and that the impact of tax havens in lowering 
effective tax rates is more pronounced for private firms than for public firms. Home country 
characteristics are also important determinants of effective tax rates for both private and public 
firms with tax havens. Given that firms use tax havens as tax avoidance mechanism in lowering 
tax burdens regardless of their listing status, regulatory and tax enforcement bodies should 
focus on private as well as public firms.  
 
 
JEL Classification: H20, M41 
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Tax Havens and Effective Tax Rates:  
An Analysis of Private versus Public European Firms 
 
1. Introduction 
The use of tax havens as a tax avoidance mechanism has come under increasing scrutiny from 
regulatory authorities and policymakers, especially in the context of the fiscal crisis that has 
afflicted many countries in recent years (Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009; Maffini, 2010; Markle & 
Shackelford, 2012a; Taylor & Richardson, 2012). Tax havens are jurisdictions that impose no 
or very low corporate taxes and hence offer firms the ability to reduce their overall tax burdens 
in their home country. Accordingly, firms with affiliates in tax havens may experience lower 
overall tax burdens than firms without such affiliates because of the opportunities for intra-
firm profit shifting from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions (Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2006).  The 
use of tax havens among multinationals is ubiquitous. For example, in 2010 all but two of the 
100 largest U.K. firms had affiliates in tax-haven jurisdictions (Grice, 2011), and 83 of the 100 
largest publicly listed U.S. firms (in terms of revenue) reported having subsidiaries in 
jurisdictions listed as tax havens or financial privacy jurisdictions (Government Accountability 
Office [GAO], 2008). The European Commission estimates that around one trillion Euros 
(about $1.3 trillion) is lost annually across the European Union (EU) member states mainly as 
a result of the exploitation of tax havens (Murphy, 2012).  
 
Thus far, empirical studies examining the link between tax-haven operations and corporate tax 
burdens have focused exclusively on the experience of publicly listed firms and generally show 
that such firms with tax-haven affiliates are able to reduce their tax burdens in their home 
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country (e.g., Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009; Harris et al., 1993; Markle & Shackelford, 2012a, 
2012b). Empirical research on the tax behavior of private firms is an area that is generally 
relatively under-researched. The lack of evidence on the effective tax burden of these firms is 
unfortunate for at least two reasons: first, private firms are more numerous than publicly listed 
firms and typically make an important contribution to the economy1; and second, although 
public and private firms generally face the same tax regime, extant studies show that private 
firms are not constrained by financial reporting when reducing their tax burdens. That is, 
private firms are more likely to accept reductions in financial accounting income to lower their 
tax bills relative to public firms (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Garrod, Kosi, & Valentincic, 
2008; Klassen, 1997; Kosi & Valentincic, 2013; Peek, Cuijpers & Buijink, 2010; Penno & 
Simon, 1986; van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008).  
 
In this paper, we aim to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of tax-haven 
operations on corporate tax burdens. First, we compare the impact of tax havens on the tax 
burden of private and public firms. Second, we look at the impact of a firm’s home tax reporting 
system, i.e., the worldwide tax system (WWTS) and the territorial tax system (TTS), on firms’ 
effective tax burdens. The WWTS has been adopted by only a few countries, including the US 
and the UK, and imposes the same tax rate on repatriated foreign profits as domestic profits; in 
contrast, under the TTS repatriated profits are not taxable which allows firms to locate their 
operations or to shift profits to foreign jurisdictions with low corporate tax rates. Several studies 
have shown the tax system to be an important determinant of the tax burden (e.g., Atwood, 
Drake, Myers, & Myers, 2012; Hines, 2006; Hubbard 2006; Maffini, 2010; Markle, 2011; 
Markle & Shackelford, 2012a), and that firms operating in countries that have adopted the 
                                                     
1 In 2010, for instance, private firms accounted for 86% of US firms with 500 or more employees (Asker et al., 2014) and they 
generate 69% of private-sector employment, 59% of sales and 49% of aggregate pre-tax income.  
5 
 
WWTS face higher tax burdens than do firms in countries that have adopted the TTS (Atwood 
et al., 2012; Maffini, 2010, Markle, 2011). Third, we examine how the home country tax 
reporting system interacts with the use of tax havens to determine the effective tax rates. Many 
previous studies have reported significant links between financial and tax reporting using 
public firms domiciled in the US (Atwood et al., 2012; Blaylock, Shevlin, & Wilson, 2012; 
Wilson, 2009); however, we examine this issue for both public and private firms headquartered 
outside the US.  
 
We employ financial statement information to estimate effective tax rates (ETRs) for the period 
2001–08 for public and private firms domiciled in 14 European Union countries and in Norway 
and Switzerland and report four key findings. First, we find that tax haven operations are 
associated with lower effective tax rates for both private and public firms. Second, we show 
that the impact of tax havens in lowering effective tax rates is more pronounced in private firms 
than in public firms. Specifically, tax haven operations reduce the overall tax burdens on 
average by 5.33% in private firms vis-à-vis 1.56% in public firms. Third, we find that, 
regardless of the firm’s home tax system, private firms with tax havens have lower effective 
tax rates vis-à-vis their public counterparts. Finally, our results show that private firms with tax 
havens domiciled in low degree of financial and tax conformity jurisdictions enjoy lower tax 
burdens. Our findings are robust to controlling for firm-specific characteristics that prior 
research has considered to be determinants of corporate tax burdens. 
 
We are not aware of any previous study that attempts to compare the impact of tax havens on 
the tax burdens of privately held versus publicly listed firms. Consequently, we believe that 
our paper contributes to the tax and accounting literature in two important ways. First, we add 
to the limited empirical literature on the tax behavior of both privately and publicly held firms, 
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especially with regard to their likely focus on tax avoidance. Second, the paper contributes to 
the extant literature on the impact of tax havens as well as firms’ home country characteristics 
by providing cross-country empirical evidence from firms domiciled outside the US.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant 
literature on tax havens and on firms’ home-country characteristics, and develops testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our data and methodology and presents descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Related Literature and Development of Hypotheses 
 
Related Literature 
Tax havens are jurisdictions that impose no or very low corporate taxes and hence offer firms 
opportunities to reduce the overall tax burden in their country of domicile (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1998). Other characteristics of tax havens 
include lack of information sharing with foreign tax authorities and non-disclosure of 
regulatory and administrative requirements.2 In some cases, firms are not required to operate 
or to be physically present in tax havens (GAO, 2008). Table 1 lists the 38 tax-haven 
jurisdictions currently existing globally.3 Extant literature examining the impact of tax-haven 
operations typically focuses on public firms. For example, Harris et al. (1993) report that over 
the period 1984–88 the tax burden of U.S. public firms with tax-haven operations was 
significantly lower than those of otherwise-similar firms; and Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) find 
that U.S. public firms operating in tax haven territories between 1995-2007 had a 1.5 
                                                     
2 Detailed discussions on issues and opportunities associated with tax havens can be found in Dharmapala (2008).  
3 We acknowledge that there is no universal list of tax havens as each organization has its own assessment criteria. 
The list of tax havens used here is based on the OECD classification, which is broadly similar to those used in 
prior literature, e.g., Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), and Dharmapala (2008).  
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percentage points lower overall tax burden than firms without operations in tax-haven 
territories. Markle and Shackelford (2012b) is the only cross-country study to examine the 
impact of tax havens, and its findings show that the tax burden of public firms with tax-haven 
affiliates is significantly lower vis-à-vis public firms without tax-haven affiliates.  
 
As mentioned above, many studies (e.g., Lee & Swenson, 2012; Maffini, 2010) focus almost 
exclusively on public firms, but we also consider the tax behavior of private firms due to the 
latter’s dominant role in many European countries. Berzins, Bøhren, and Rydland (2008), for 
instance, report that across Europe, over 90% of registered firms are privately held and that 
they generate four times higher revenues and control twice as many assets as publicly listed 
firms. Thus, analyzing the tax experience of private firms is of interest in its own right and 
offers a more comprehensive understanding of corporate tax burdens. However, as already 
noted, although there has been much research on the tax behavior of public firms, similar 
research relating to privately held firms is quite limited, especially for firms headquartered 
outside the US. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 
Development of Hypotheses 
Both private and public European firms generally face similar financial reporting and tax 
regulations (Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006). In particular, prior to the adoption of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 by public firms, financial 
statements for both private and public firms were drawn up using comparable reporting 
standards and were required to be audited.4 Private and public firms were also subjected to the 
same provisions in determining tax obligations. However, several factors could result in 
                                                     
4 Exemptions from preparing financial statements are allowed for very small firms, and these firms are excluded 
from our analysis.  
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different rates of usage of tax havens by public and private firms. On the one hand, greater 
usage by public firms might be encouraged by the fact that they face the capital market 
pressures with respect to profit performance that private firms do not, and that they are likely 
to have greater resources and available expertise to engage in tax planning. On the other hand, 
public firms are also more visible and the use of tax havens can attract more hostile attention 
from stakeholders generally, and though private firms do not face public scrutiny, they may 
have less incentive to use tax havens if their status allows them to engage in other less costly 
tax avoidance schemes. In addition, the different ownership structure and financial reporting 
objectives of private and publicly held firms has given rise to a significant variation in the 
demand from them for high quality and transparent financial information. In particular, private 
firms are more closely held and have greater managerial ownership (Chen, Hope, Li, & Wang, 
2011). In this setting, information asymmetry is typically alleviated using the “insider” model, 
given that the suppliers of funds are often actively involved in the decision-making process and 
in the monitoring of firm activities, and thus they have direct access to inside information (Ball 
& Shivakumar, 2005; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008). Furthermore, in comparison to 
public firms, private firms do not use financial statements as extensively in contracting and 
communicating with outside parties. Consequently, private firms have relatively less incentive 
to focus on reported earnings and are more likely to be driven by tax and other considerations 
(Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Beatty & Harris, 1999). Based on the foregoing, we predict that tax 
haven operations are associated with lower effective tax rates for private firms as compared to 
public firms. Therefore, we formally hypothesize:  
 
H1: Tax haven operations are associated with lower ETRs in private firms, relative to 
public firms. 
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Following Atwood et al. (2012), we also consider the impact of firms’ home-country 
characteristics on the relative tax burden of private and public firms. The first characteristic we 
consider is the tax system used by the home country, given that it has been shown in the 
literature to be an important tax determinant (e.g., Atwood et al., 2012; Hines, 2006; Hubbard 
2006; Maffini, 2010; Markle, 2011; Markle & Shackelford, 2012a). In essence, a country can 
adopt either a worldwide or a territorial system in determining corporate taxes.5 Under a 
territorial tax system (TTS), repatriated foreign income is not taxable and, as a result, firms can 
reduce their tax burden by locating their operations or shifting their profits to jurisdictions with 
low or no corporate taxation. On the other hand, countries with a worldwide tax system 
(WWTS) impose the same tax rates on foreign income as domestic income, if and when it is 
repatriated to the home country (Blouin & Krull, 2009). Consequently, firms domiciled in 
WWTS would, on average, face higher tax bills. In Europe, the UK changed from the WWTS 
to TTS in 2009, leaving Ireland and Greece as the only countries using the worldwide tax 
system.6 The US, South Korea, and Mexico remain the only major countries outside Europe 
using the worldwide tax system. This tax system has been criticized for its adverse impact on 
U.S. firms’ competitiveness vis-à-vis multinationals headquartered in territorial tax system 
jurisdictions because of the additional tax burdens imposed on repatriated profits (Hines, 2006; 
Hubbard, 2006), and because it encourages firms to “park” profits generated from foreign 
operations outside their home country (Blouin et al., 2012).7 Maffini (2010) compares the tax 
burden under the worldwide and territorial tax systems of companies headquartered in 15 
OECD countries and reports that the former face a higher corporate tax burden. Similarly, 
Markle (2011) finds that firms with home-country territorial tax systems shift more profits 
                                                     
5 Detailed discussion on worldwide taxation versus territorial taxation can be found in Fleming, Peroni, and Shay 
(2008).  
6 Given that our dataset is only up to 2008, the UK is classified as a worldwide tax system country for the purpose 
of our analysis. Greece is not included in our sample due to unavailability of data.  
7 For instance, the aggregate amount of undistributed income owned by U.S. multinationals in 2004 was estimated 
at US$ 804 billion (Redmiles, 2008). 
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among their foreign subsidiaries overall than do firms with home-country worldwide tax 
systems. Atwood et al. (2012) also find that tax avoidance is higher (lower) for firms in home 
countries with a territorial (worldwide) tax system in a study of firms in 22 countries between 
1995 and 2007. Markle and Shackelford (2012a) is the only study we know of that finds a 
lower tax burden for firms headquartered in worldwide tax jurisdictions; using a dataset 
comprising publicly listed firms in 82 countries, they report that firms domiciled in WWTS, 
on average, enjoyed 1.4% lower ETRs as compared to their counterparts in TTS.  Based on the 
foregoing discussion, we hypothesize: 
H2: Home country tax system (i.e., WWTS vs. TTS) moderates the relation between 
tax haven use, and the ETRs of private versus public firms. 
 
Another important home-country characteristic examined is the impact of conformity between 
financial reporting and tax reporting on effective tax rates.8 Examples of financial and tax 
reporting conformity include: (i) the use of financial accounting regulations for tax estimation 
or vice-versa; and (ii) the use of tax provisions for specified items in both the financial 
statements and the tax returns (Lamb, Nobes, & Roberts, 1998; Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001).9 
For example, firms domiciled in jurisdictions with a high degree of financial–tax reporting 
conformity may have less opportunity to avoid taxes without decreasing reported income 
because financial accounting policy choices are directly linked to taxable income. In other 
words, financial–tax reporting conformity reduces firms’ incentives to engage in upward 
                                                     
8 Although the determination of taxable income is based on individual accounts, accounting policy choice used in 
consolidated accounts is often similar to that used in individual accounts, and likewise, mainly for reasons of 
simplicity and cost savings.  
9 For instance, until fiscal year 2009, the reverse authoritative principle (Maßgeblichkeitsprinzip, Sec. 5 (1) 1 
EStG) was a dominant feature for financial and tax reporting in Germany where taxable income has to be 
determined in accordance with German accounting standards, and the recognition and measurement policies used 
in financial accounting must generally be consistently used in tax returns. This authoritative principle was 
abolished with the introduction of new regulation Accounting Law Modernization Act (BilMoG-Act) in 2010. 
Austrian firms are also subject to similar regulations. 
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earnings manipulations as it also increases tax burdens (Coppens & Peek, 2005; Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2009; Lee & Swenson, 2012). Furthermore, Atwood et al. (2012) argue that tax 
authorities act as an additional enforcement mechanism of financial reporting when higher 
conformity between reported earnings and taxable income is required. 
 
As a result of increased monitoring and less flexibility in accounting policy choice, firms 
domiciled in high financial and tax conformity jurisdictions, on average, engage in fewer 
“creative accounting” activities (Desai, 2005).  Firms in such countries may also trade off tax 
savings for income-increasing accounting choices, i.e., if firms decide to maximize reported 
earnings, the corresponding accounting methods used may increase taxable income and, thus, 
taxes (Lee & Swenson, 2012). Although several studies have documented significant 
interactions between financial and tax reporting, such as financial and tax reporting 
aggressiveness (Frank, Lynch, & Rego, 2009), tax avoidance (Blaylock et al., 2012), and tax 
sheltering (Wilson, 2009) in the U.S. context, little is known about these effects on corporate 
tax burdens in other jurisdictions. Although the degree of financial–tax reporting conformity 
varies considerably across European countries (Lee and Swenson, 2012), on the basis of prior 
relevant research studies (e.g., Alexander & Archer, 1998; Coppens & Peek, 2005; Lamb et 
al., 1998; Lee & Swenson, 2012; McLeay, 1999), we classify Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland as countries with high financial–
tax conformity, and vice-versa for Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. 
Empirical evidence shows that firms domiciled in jurisdictions with a lower (higher) degree of 
financial–tax conformity on average engage in more (less) tax avoidance activities. For 
example, using a cross-country dataset, Atwood et al. (2012) report firms engage in less tax 
avoidance when their home countries have higher book-tax conformity, while Lee and 
Swenson (2012) find that book-tax conformity rules increase tax burdens in publicly traded 
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firms domiciled across the European Union. As mentioned earlier, private firms on average are 
less visible in term of public scrutiny, and they do not use financial statements as widely in 
communicating with outsiders. Hence, in comparison to public firms, private firms face fewer 
pressures to abide by the book-tax conformity rules in reducing ETRs. Based on the foregoing, 
we hypothesize: 
 
H3: Home country book-tax conformity (i.e., high vs. low book-tax conformity) 
moderates the relation between tax haven use, and the ETRs of private versus public 
firms. 
 
We also consider several control variables that prior research has established to be determinants 
of effective corporate tax burdens. These controls include firm-level characteristics, such as 
the presence of foreign operations in non-tax-haven jurisdictions, firm size, leverage, 
performance, capital intensity, inventory intensity, and statutory tax rates at the county level.10  
In particular, firms with foreign operations in non-tax havens are also more flexible in terms 
of structuring their activities to reduce their tax burden, including the shifting of profits to low-
tax jurisdictions by, for example, manipulating international transfer pricing to foreign 
subsidiaries or vice versa, allocating high-interest loans to high-tax jurisdictions, or re-
assigning certain expenditures to countries with high-tax regimes to reduce reported earnings 
in them (Clausing, 2003; Gresik, 2001; Hines, 1999). In principle, this greater flexibility 
suggests that firms with foreign operations in non-tax havens also face lower ETRs than firms 
with domestic-only operations. Regarding firm size, larger firms might face higher ETRs 
because of their greater political visibility (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Zimmerman, 1983) or 
because they find it more difficult to pursue tax planning (Scholes & Wolfson, 1992), or they 
might face lower ETRs because they have greater resources available to manipulate the 
                                                     
10 See Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for a detail discussion of the determinants of effective tax rates. 
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political process in their favor and engage in tax planning (Siegfried, 1974). A firm’s financing 
decisions could affect its ETR if the tax laws allow for differential tax treatment contingent on 
its capital structure, for example, between equity and debt financing (Gupta & Newberry, 
1997). A firm’s investment decisions might have an effect on the effective tax burden because 
of the tax treatment of depreciable assets (Stickney & McGee, 1982), inventories (Zimmerman, 
1983), and R&D expenditures (Gupta & Newberry, 1997).11 Similarly, debt financing can 
reduce the corporate tax burden since interest expenses are tax deductible, whereas dividends 
paid to shareholders are not tax deductible (Hanlon, 2003). Firm profitability is considered an 
important determinant of the effective tax burden because a change in operating results can 
lead to a change in the tax burden, with more profitable firms tending to have higher effective 
tax rates (Chen et al., 2010). Finally, several studies (Atwood et al., 2012; Devereux et al., 
2008; Nicodème, 2001) point out that statutory tax rates for each country of domicile are also 
an important determinant of corporate tax rates.  
 
3. Measuring ETRs, data, and methodology  
 
3.1 Measuring ETRs 
We employ the ETR as the measure of the corporate tax burden. It has been used widely in 
empirical tax research (e.g., Callihan, 1994; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010; Markle & Shackelford, 
2012a, 2012b; Nicodème, 2001; Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001) because it provides a summary 
measure of cross-country differences in statutory tax rates (STRs) and tax incentives. 
Furthermore, ETRs provide an indication of whether firms with similar characteristics but 
located in different domiciles are subject to substantially different tax treatments. ETRs are 
typically computed by dividing some estimate of tax liability by income.12 Here, we use two 
                                                     
11 We exclude R&D intensity from our analysis, as it is not available for our dataset. Furthermore, the vast 
majority of private firms do not undertake R&D activities. 
12 See Table 1 of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p.140) for alternative measures of ETRs used in the tax literature. 
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measures to determine corporate tax burdens. Our first measure (ETR1) is calculated as firms’ 
current tax expense divided by their pre-tax income, a measure that has been used in numerous 
empirical studies (e.g., Lee & Swenson, 2012; Markle & Shackelford, 2012a, 2012b; 
Richardson & Lanis, 2007). This measure captures permanent book-tax differences and reflects 
the extent of aggressive tax planning (Chen et al., 2010). The second measure (ETR2) is 
calculated as firms’ current tax expense divided by their operating cash flows. Cash flow from 
operations is used as an alternative measure as it mitigates systematic differences in accounting 
method choices across different jurisdictions (e.g., Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Zimmerman, 
1983).  
 
3.2 The data  
Our data on private and public firms is from the Amadeus database compiled by Bureau Van 
Dijk.13 Our initial sample comprises all firm-year observations for both private and public firms 
domiciled in 14 European countries for which consolidated financial statements are available 
for the period 2001 to 2008. These countries are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
The choice of countries included in our sample is based on the availability of data. We use 
consolidated accounts in order to alleviate the difference between reported and taxable profits, 
as well as timing differences arising from either semi-permanent or permanent discrepancies 
(Buijink et al., 2002). To arrive at our final sample, we winsorize firms whose ETR is greater 
than one or less than zero, and firms with missing values for variables employed in our 
statistical models. We also winsorize all continuous variables at the top and bottom 1% in order 
to mitigate the influence of outliers. Our final sample for ETR1 (ETR2) consists of 135,578 
                                                     
13 More specifically, we use the April 2010 version of Amadeus to source all variables except for tax-haven and 
foreign non-tax-haven affiliates. With respect to tax-haven and foreign non-tax-haven affiliates, the dataset 
provided by Amadeus is time-invariant; hence, we collate these two variables for each sampled year using the 
historical Amadeus database available on CD ROMs.  
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(124,666) firm-year observations for private firms and 13,303 (12,330) firm-year observations 
for public firms.  
 
3.3 Research methodology 
We employ a fixed effects regression model separately for private and public firms and control 
for sector of operations, country of domicile, and year dummies. Furthermore, we use robust 
regression techniques to mitigate the influence of outliers in all specifications. Our first 
regression model is as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  β0 +  β1𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ɛ𝑖𝑐𝑡                                        (1) 
 
where ETR is either ETR1 or ETR2, and  TAXHAVEN is a dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a tax-haven jurisdiction, and 0 otherwise. The control 
variables are: a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a 
non-tax-haven jurisdiction, and 0 otherwise, NONHAVENMNC14; a measure of firm size, 
which is the natural log of total assets, SIZE; a measure of leverage, which is the ratio of total 
long-term debt to total assets, LEV; a measure of firm performance, which is the ratio of pre-
tax operating profit to total assets, PERF; the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total 
assets, CAPINT; the ratio of inventories to total assets, INVINT; and the statutory tax rate in 
each country and in each year, STR. We predict that the coefficient  β
1
 for TAXHAVEN is 
negative for both private and public firms, indicating that operations in tax-haven jurisdictions 
reduce the effective tax rates. To the extent that private firms are more aggressive in lowering 
tax burdens, we also expect the β1 for private firms to be larger (more negative) than that of 
public firms.  
                                                     
14 Here, we are testing across three groups: (i) MNCs with foreign subsidiaries in tax havens (TAXHAVEN); (ii) MNCs with 
foreign subsidiaries in non-tax havens (NONHAVENMNC); and (iii) domestic firms that by definition do not have foreign 
subsidiaries. Hence, the NONHAVENMNC control variable is not merely the inverse (i.e., the zeroes) of the TAXHAVEN 
variable. 
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In order to confirm our results in Model (1), we also estimate a pool regression using the 
following specification:  
 
 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  β0 + β1𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + β2𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡+ β3𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡  + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  ɛ𝑖𝑐𝑡          (2)  
        
 
where ETR, TAXHAVEN, and the control variables are defined as in the regression model (1), 
and PRIVATE is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is privately-held, and 0 if a 
firm is publicly-held. Consistent with model (1) above, we expect coefficients β1 and β2  to be 
negative. We extend our analysis by assessing the influence of firms’ home country 
characteristics on private and public firms with tax havens. In so doing, we simultaneously run 
model (2) using seemingly unrelated estimation (SUEST) for (i) WWTS and TTS, and (ii) high 
and low TAXCONF. For ease of reference, the definitions of the variables are summarized in 
Table 2. 
 
 [Table 2 about here] 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 provides a summary of mean statutory tax rates (STR), ETR1, and ETR2 during the 
sample period. The three main points to note are: (i) the marked cross-country differences in 
STRs and ETRs; (ii) the ETRs between public and private firms, and the ETRs between firms 
with and without tax-haven operations, appear to be different, and across all countries; in 
particular, the ETRs of firms with tax havens are lower than firms without tax havens; and (iii) 
the ETRs are generally lower than the STRs with the exception of Italy and Ireland where 
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average ETRs are higher than average STRs. This appears to be due mainly to additional sector-
specific or regional taxes faced by the firms domiciled in these jurisdictions.15  
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the control variables, for private and public firms, and 
for such firms with tax haven operations. Private make much less use of tax havens than do 
private firms, they are smaller in size, use a higher proportion of debt financing, are marginally 
more profitable, and have a higher asset mix than public firms. Moreover, the firms with tax 
havens have different characteristics than firms without them; this is consistent with the prior 
literature (e.g. Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009). For example, firms operating in tax havens are larger 
in terms of total assets and more profitable than firms without tax-haven operations.  
 
Table 5 presents correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables for private firms and 
public firms. The results show high correlations between HIGHTAXJUR and STR (0.659 and 
0.720 for private and public firms, respectively), between TAXCONF and WWTS (-0.666 and -
0.798 for private and public firms, respectively), and to a lesser degree between TAXCONF 
and HIGHTAXJUR (-0.401 and -0.208 for private and public firms, respectively). However, 
these highly correlated variables are not included in the same regression model. The other 
correlation coefficients are relatively low, indicating that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an 
issue in our regression estimates.   
 
 [Tables 4 & 5 about here] 
 
                                                     
15 For example, the regional administrative tax rate (Imposta sul Reddito delle Attivita Produttive, IRAP) for Italian 
firms was 4.25% in 2001, in addition to a 36% tax rate imposed by the central government, making for an overall 
STR of 40.25% (Manzo, 2011). In the case of Ireland, the tax rate imposed on real estate is considerably higher 
than the general tax rate on corporate profits (Elschner & Vanborren, 2009). 
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4.2 Regression results 
Regression results for the baseline model are reported in Table 6. The results indicate a strong, 
negative, and statistically significant impact of tax haven operations on effective corporate tax 
rates for private and public firms and for both measures of the effective tax burden. Moreover, 
the impact of tax-haven operations on lowering the tax burden appears to be more pronounced 
in the case of private firms. The coefficients on the tax haven variable are -0.0533 (p-
value<0.01) for private firms and -0.0156 (p-value<0.01) for public firms in the case of ETR1, 
and -0.0385 (p-value<0.01) for private firms and -0.0225 (p-value<0.01) for public firms in the 
case of ETR2. This is consistent with tax havens allowing firms to engage in tax avoidance 
activities by shifting taxable income to those jurisdictions, regardless of listing status. Indeed, 
the impact of tax havens in lowering corporate tax burdens is persistent across all of our 
subsequent regression models. In terms of the economic significance, our results show that tax 
haven operations reduce the overall tax burden on average by 5.33% (3.85%) in private firms 
vis-à-vis 1.56% (2.25%) in public firms using the ETR1 (ETR2) measure.16  The Chow test 
show that the difference in the coefficients between private and public firms is negative and 
highly significant, i.e., -0.0370 (-0.0160) for ETR (ETR2). Thus, this result confirms our 
conjecture as well as those in the prior literature (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2005) that tax 
determination is considered to be more important in a private than a public firm setting.  
 
With respect to the control variables, the results indicate that the presence of foreign operations 
in non-tax havens (NONHAVENMNC) is an important determinant of the ETR. The estimated 
coefficients on NONHAVENMNC are negative and highly significant in the case of private 
firms for both ETR measures, and for public firms in the case of the ETR2 measure of the tax 
burden. Hence, it appears that both private and public firms engage in tax avoidance 
                                                     
16 Although the sample and estimation model are different, our result for European public firms is very similar 
to that of US public firms reported by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009).  
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mechanisms; this is similar to findings of prior U.S. studies using public listed firms (Cazier et 
al., 2009; Rego, 2003; Wilson, 2009). Of the firm-specific variables, the estimated coefficients 
on firm size (SIZE) are consistently positive and statistically significant in all cases for both 
measures of the tax burden. The results imply that larger firms pay higher taxes in the EU than 
do smaller firms; this is consistent with Zimmerman’s (1983) “political costs” hypothesis. The 
coefficients on firm leverage (LEV), capital intensity (CAPINT), and inventory intensity 
(INVINT) are negative and are always highly significant. This is consistent with the notion that 
firms use these variables as tax shields (e.g., Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Lee & Swenson, 2012; 
Markle & Shackelford, 2012b; Stickney & McGee, 1982). The coefficients on firm profitability 
(PERF) are positive and highly significant, indicating that more profitable privately owned 
firms face a higher effective tax rate (Gupta & Newberry, 1997). Finally, the coefficients on 
statutory tax rates (STR) are consistently positive and highly significant in all models, 
suggesting that higher home-country tax rates are associated with higher corporate tax rates; 
this is similar to prior research (e.g., Lee & Swenson, 2012).  
 
 [Table 6 about here] 
 
The pool regression results for both private and public firms are reported in Model 1 of Table 
7, which excludes the coefficients on the control variables because of space considerations.17 
The results confirm the baseline findings reported in Table 6. That is, for both ETR measures, 
the estimated coefficients of TAXHAVEN are negative and statistically significant for all 
models, which is consistent with prior literature that firms use tax haven operations to lower 
ETRs. The PRIVATE*TAXHAVEN interaction term is negative and highly significant, 
implying that  the impact of tax-haven operations on lowering tax burdens is more pronounced 
                                                     
17 We include the same control variables as in Table 6. 
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in the case of private firms. As the higher percentage of private firms relative to public firms 
in our sample may influence the empirical results, we follow prior literature (e.g. Dittmar et 
al., 2003) and use a weighted least squares (WLS) regression to ensure that both private and 
public firms receive equal weight in the regression estimations. The WLS result is reported in 
Model 2 of Table 7 and shows that the coefficient of PRIVATE*TAXHAVEN interaction is 
qualitatively similar to the main result. Hence, our empirical result is not influenced by the 
unequal sample size of private and public firms. 
 
 [Table 7 about here] 
 
Next, we consider two important firm home-country characteristics as moderating variables of 
effective corporate tax rates, i.e., (i) home country tax systems and (ii) financial and tax 
conformity. We simultaneously run model (2) using seemingly unrelated estimation (SUEST) 
for firms domiciled in world-wide tax system (WWTS) and territorial tax system (TTS) 
jurisdictions. Panel A of Table 8 shows that, except for ETR1 of WWTS, the coefficients on 
TAXHAVEN are negative in all estimates. That is, regardless of home-country tax systems, our 
results show that the use of tax havens lowers ETRs for both public and private firms. The 
estimated coefficients on PRIVATE*TAXHAVEN are negative and statistically significant in all 
models, which suggests that ETRs for private firms with tax haven operations are lower relative 
to public firms. Taken together, our results appear to suggest that private firms with tax havens 
are more tax aggressive vis-à-vis public firms, regardless of the home country tax system.   
Panel B of Table 8 reports results for the book-tax conformity (TAXCONF) where we also 
simultaneously estimate high and low TAXCONF using SUEST. The estimated coefficients on 
TAXHAVEN are negative and highly significant for firms domiciled in low TAXCONF 
countries. The coefficients on the PRIVATE*TAXHAVEN interaction terms are negative and 
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highly significant for ETR1, suggesting that the use of tax havens by private firms bring 
economic benefits in lowering effective tax rates, which  is consistent with our hypothesis. 
 
 
 [Table 8 about here] 
 
 
4.3 Additional analyses 
In this section, we extend our analysis and offer robustness to our main conclusions.  To 
economize on space the results are not tabulated.18 First, we partition the sample into high-tax 
and low-tax jurisdiction countries, which we define as jurisdictions in which firms’ ETRs are 
above and below the median in each year, respectively. We then examine whether tax haven 
operations by firms headquartered in high-tax jurisdiction countries is an important determinant 
of tax burdens.19 As in the main analysis, the estimated coefficients on PRIVATE are negative 
and highly significant regardless of whether private firms operate in high or low tax 
jurisdictions.  The coefficients of the interaction effects on PRIVATE and TAXHAVEN are also 
similar to those in the main analysis, i.e., negative and significant. Second, to match between 
public and private firms of similar sizes, we re-estimate the main regression (2) but only for 
larger firms in the sample (thereby excluding a large number of smaller private firms from the 
sample). The empirical results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7, i.e., they 
indicate that private firms are more aggressive in avoiding tax through tax-haven operations 
than are public firms. Finally, as our research period coincides with the mandatory adoption of 
the IFRS in 2005 for public European firms, we also tested for the effects of these standards 
on firms’ ETRs by incorporating into the estimate a 0, 1 dummy variable representing their 
                                                     
18 The results are available from the corresponding author on request. 
19 We include the same control variables as in the main analysis except for STR because of its high correlation 
with HIGHTAXJUR.  
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adoption. The results suggest that adoption of IFRS had little impact on the corporate tax 
burden of publicly listed firms, which is consistent with results reported by Eberhartinger and 
Klostermann (2007).  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we have assessed the impact of tax havens on the relative effective tax burden of 
private and publicly listed firms domiciled in Europe. We believe that this is the first study to 
offer a comprehensive analysis of tax avoidance by means of tax-haven affiliates of firms, 
regardless of their listing status. Our principal result is that tax havens is used as a tax avoidance 
mechanism by both privately held and publicly listed firms, and that the impact of tax havens 
in lowering effective tax rates is more pronounced in privately held firms than in publicly listed 
firms. Furthermore, our findings indicate that firms’ home-country characteristics (i.e., a 
worldwide tax reporting system, financial and tax conformity, as well as high corporate tax 
rates) are important in determining effective tax rates.   
 
Our findings have several potential implications for E.U. corporate tax policymakers. In 
particular, they should assist tax watchdogs in their efforts to understand the tax behavior of 
both privately held and publicly listed firms. To the extent that firms evidently benefit from 
using tax havens as a tax avoidance mechanism regardless of their listing status, tax compliance 
and enforcement authorities should focus not only on public firms but also on private firms. 
Indeed, despite the relatively low proportion of private firms using tax havens, our empirical 
results show that such firms are more aggressive in avoiding tax through tax-haven operations 
than are public firms. Furthermore, substantial progress still needs to be made in the E.U. 
member states that currently have varying standards as to the treatment of tax havens and 
therefore different provisions for dealing with them. 
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Finally, our study is subject to two limitations. First, our ETR measures are drawn from 
financial statements prepared for investors and not for tax authorities, as data on tax returns are 
private and unavailable. Hence, our results should be interpreted with some caution. Second, 
our empirical analysis is based on the premise that tax haven operations affects corporate tax 
burdens, but we acknowledge that it is difficult to establish causality in this line of research. 
Nonetheless, we believe that this is the best endeavor to date to analyze comprehensively the 
tax behavior of both private and public firms in Europe. It would be useful for future research 
to examine the propensity for a firm to use a tax haven, and whether this is different between 
public and private firms.  
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  Table 1 
  Tax haven countries and territories 
Andorra 
Anguilla 
Antigua and Barbados 
Aruba 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bermuda 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Channel Islands 
Cook Islands 
Cyprus 
Dominica 
Grenada 
Isle of Man 
Liberia 
Liechtenstein 
Maldives 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritius 
Monaco 
Montserrat 
Nauru 
Netherlands Antilles 
Niue 
Panama 
St Kitts and Nevis 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Samoa 
San Marino 
Seychelles 
Tonga 
Turks and Caicos 
Vanuatu 
Virgin Island (US) 
         Source: OECD (2011) 
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Table 2 
Variable definitions  
Variable Description Definition  
 
ETR1 
 
Effective tax rate, first measure 
 
Current tax expense divided by pre-tax income 
 
 
ETR2 Effective tax rate, second measure Current tax expense divided by cash flow from 
operations 
 
 
TAXHAVEN Tax haven Set to 1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a tax-haven 
jurisdiction and 0 otherwise 
 
PRIVATE Privately-held firm Set to 1 if a firm is privately-held and 0 otherwise  
NONHAVENMNC Foreign operations Set to 1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a non-tax-
haven jurisdiction and 0 otherwise 
 
WWTS Worldwide tax system Set to 1 if a firm is headquartered in a jurisdiction with a 
worldwide tax system and 0 otherwise 
 
TTS Territorial tax system Set to 1 if a firm is headquartered in a jurisdiction with a 
territorial tax system and 0 otherwise 
 
TAXCONF Financial–tax conformity 
jurisdiction 
Set to 1 if a firm is headquartered in a jurisdiction whose 
financial reporting is closely linked with tax reporting 
and 0 otherwise 
 
 
SIZE Firm size Natural log of total assets   
LEV Leverage Ratio of total long-term debt to total assets  
CAPINT Capital intensity Ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets  
INVINT Inventory intensity Ratio of inventory to total assets  
PERF Profitability Ratio of pre-tax operating profit to total assets  
STR Statutory tax rate Statutory tax rate in each jurisdiction and in each year  
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Table 3  
Mean STR, ETR1, and ETR2 
 
Note: Statutory tax rates (STR) are calculated from OECD (2011). ETR1 is the first effective tax rate measure, calculated by 
dividing current tax expense by pre-tax income; and ETR2 is the second effective tax rate measure, calculated by dividing 
current tax expense by cash flow from operations. Sample period is between 2001 and 2008, inclusive. Number of observations 
for each ETR is reported in parenthesis.  
 
  
Private Public
Private      
Tax Haven 
Public      
Tax Haven Private Public
Private      
Tax Haven 
Public      
Tax Haven 
Belgium 35.54 27.70 25.84 21.45 22.73 23.76 22.77 23.13 22.96
(3091) (421) (108) (43) (3171) (348) (92) (34)
Denmark 28.25 25.15 26.96 20.05 18.38 22.93 21.66 18.65 22.41
(7884) (300) (36) (22) (7654) (277) (36) (21)
Finland 27.50 24.15 26.41 0.82 25.16 21.41 22.59 0.62 24.83
(8920) (561) (5) (31) (9146) (492) (5) (26)
France 35.12 25.06 25.61 28.55 26.33 25.63 26.40 28.41 26.41
(1462) (1954) (10) (174) (1349) (1921) (9) (170)
Germany 37.97 26.38 28.01 28.10 27.24 22.31 26.67 19.93 27.83
(12979) (2314) (6) (62) (13156) (2130) (5) (58)
Ireland 13.88 19.94 15.68 7.18 7.95 31.63 18.09 5.21 9.64
(4936) (144) (1) (10) (2249) (98) (1) (7)
Italy 33.19 39.46 33.88 33.45 27.92 36.47 32.14 31.77 25.32
(12463) (667) (83) (32) (12941) (661) (82) (33)
Netherlands 31.33 25.54 23.18 23.71 20.42 23.20 22.03 19.22 16.33
(8895) (448) (269) (82) (3341) (179) (103) (30)
Norway 28.00 21.02 23.58 9.98 17.58 21.28 21.12 6.91 15.45
(7528) (187) (5) (11) (7289) (174) (5) (9)
Portugal 29.59 23.90 18.83 18.46 17.18 16.62 14.27 18.75 14.44
(1021) (248) (2) (20) (1140) (268) (6) (20)
Spain 34.06 26.02 24.64 26.17 19.47 24.93 21.57 24.04 19.12
(8636) (589) (154) (44) (8685) (594) (148) (48)
Sweden 28.00 22.22 21.38 20.11 27.95 21.61 19.93 17.79 25.58
(24127) (870) (43) (32) (20457) (618) (43) (20)
Switzerland 22.81 21.32 20.83 22.38 22.89 13.01 17.44 22.00 20.56
(451) (903) (5) (79) (490) (920) (4) (82)
United Kingdom 29.75 24.18 24.06 23.67 26.59 22.20 22.70 21.18 22.44
(33185) (3697) (77) (243) (33598) (3650) (80) (245)
All countries 25.46 25.09 24.44 24.44 23.90 23.60 22.61 22.95
(135578) (13303) (804) (885) (124666) (12330) (619) (803)
ETR1 ETR2
STR
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Note: SIZE is the natural log of total assets; LEV is the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets; PERF is the ratio of pre-tax 
operating profit to total assets; CAPINT is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets; INVINT is the ratio of 
inventory to total assets. Sample period is between 2001and 2008, inclusive.  
Mean
Standard 
deviation
25% 50% 75%
Private firms (N = 135578)
SIZE 10.282 1.807 9.100 10.264 11.418
LEV 0.204 0.188 0.057 0.151 0.297
PERF 0.066 0.100 0.032 0.063 0.107
CAPINT 0.336 0.236 0.146 0.295 0.480
INVINT 0.182 0.159 0.042 0.152 0.279
Public firms (N = 13303)
SIZE 12.152 1.748 10.928 12.134 13.481
LEV 0.162 0.145 0.045 0.128 0.239
PERF 0.052 0.132 0.034 0.068 0.107
CAPINT 0.270 0.215 0.098 0.223 0.386
INVINT 0.145 0.131 0.029 0.122 0.222
Private firms with tax haven operations (N = 804)
SIZE 12.613 1.518 11.621 12.482 13.816
LEV 0.153 0.144 0.037 0.112 0.227
PERF 0.082 0.083 0.047 0.077 0.111
CAPINT 0.309 0.223 0.131 0.251 0.455
INVINT 0.132 0.132 0.017 0.099 0.196
Public firms with tax haven operations (N = 885)
SIZE 13.671 1.401 12.811 13.998 14.771
LEV 0.183 0.143 0.067 0.167 0.262
PERF 0.079 0.080 0.044 0.074 0.111
CAPINT 0.288 0.221 0.116 0.224 0.395
INVINT 0.113 0.105 0.021 0.090 0.179
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Table 5 
Correlation matrix 
 
Note: TAXHAVEN is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a tax-haven jurisdiction and 0 otherwise; NONHAVENMNC is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a non-tax-haven jurisdiction and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural log of total assets; LEV is the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets; PERF is the 
ratio of pre-tax operating profit to total assets; CAPINT is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets; INVINT is the ratio of inventory to total assets; STR is the statutory tax rate in 
each country and in each year; WWTS is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a jurisdiction with a worldwide tax system and 0 otherwise; TAXCONF is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a jurisdiction whose financial reporting is closely linked with tax reporting and 0 otherwise; HIGHTAXJUR is a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a jurisdiction whose corporate tax rate is higher than the median and 0 otherwise. Sample period is between 2001and 2008, inclusive.  
* denotes significance at the 5% level or more. 
Private firms (N = 135578)
TAXHAVEN NONHAVENMNC SIZE LEV PERF CAPINT INVINT STR WWTS HIGHTAXJUR TAXCONF
TAXHAVEN 1
NONHAVENMNC -0.034 * 1
SIZE 0.100 * 0.249 * 1
LEV -0.021 * -0.110 * 0.005 1
PERF 0.013 * 0.024 * -0.018 * -0.084 * 1
CAPINT -0.009 * -0.098 * 0.044 * 0.374 * -0.102 * 1
INVINT -0.025 * 0.046 * -0.110 * -0.149 * 0.056 * -0.410 * 1
STR 0.032 * 0.075 * 0.216 * -0.031 * 0.022 * -0.054 * 0.022 * 1
WWTS -0.032 * -0.166 * 0.035 * -0.047 * -0.138 * 0.009 * -0.097 * -0.297 * 1
HIGHTAXJUR 0.029 * 0.036 * 0.321 * -0.116 * -0.068 * -0.069 * -0.030 * 0.659 * 0.260 * 1
TAXCONF -0.031 * 0.056 * -0.115 * 0.112 * 0.101 * 0.007 * 0.062 * 0.143 * -0.666 * -0.401 *
Public firms (N = 13303)
TAXHAVEN 1
NONHAVENMNC -0.309 * 1
SIZE 0.232 * 0.201 * 1
LEV 0.039 * -0.050 * 0.201 * 1
PERF 0.053 * 0.110 * 0.291 * -0.010 1
CAPINT 0.022 * -0.077 * 0.162 * 0.292 * 0.058 * 1
INVINT -0.066 * 0.089 * -0.050 * -0.104 * 0.092 * -0.194 * 1
STR -0.035 * 0.088 * -0.037 * -0.011 0.035 * -0.090 * 0.053 * 1
WWTS -0.002 -0.116 * -0.088 * 0.019 * -0.084 * 0.063 * -0.115 * -0.315 * 1
HIGHTAXJUR -0.018 * 0.010 -0.024 * -0.016 0.021 * -0.038 * -0.010 0.702 * 0.174 * 1
TAXCONF -0.035 * 0.074 * 0.023 * -0.019 * 0.060 * -0.101 * 0.072 * 0.268 * -0.798 * -0.208 *
1
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Table 6 
The impact of tax havens on private vs. public firms’ ETRs 
 
Note: ETR1 is the first effective tax rate measure calculated by dividing current tax expense by pre-tax income; ETR2 is the 
second effective tax rate measure calculated by dividing current tax expense by cash flow from operations. TAXHAVEN is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a tax-haven jurisdiction and 0 otherwise; 
NONHAVENMNC is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a non-tax-haven jurisdiction 
and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural log of total assets;  LEV is the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets; PERF is the 
ratio of pre-tax operating profit to total assets; CAPINT is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets; INVINT 
is the ratio of inventory to total assets; STR is the statutory tax rate in each country and in each year. Sample period is between 
2001and 2008, inclusive. For each variable, robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Difference 
Private-Public
Difference 
Private-Public
TAXHAVEN -0.0533 *** -0.0156 *** -0.0370 *** -0.0385 *** -0.0225 *** -0.0160 *
(0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0079) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0085)
Controls
NONHAVENMNC -0.0039 *** 0.0008 -0.0047 -0.0083 *** -0.0151 *** 0.0069 *
(0.0013) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0014) (0.1167) (0.0037)
SIZE 0.0077 *** 0.0064 *** -0.0013 0.0063 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0011
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0010)
LEV -0.1359 *** -0.1261 *** -0.0098 -0.0096 *** -0.0481 *** 0.0385 ***
(0.0026) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0029) (0.0111) (0.0115)
PERF 0.1647 *** 0.2723 *** -0.1076 *** 0.3676 *** 0.3429 *** 0.0247 *
(0.0039) (0.0086) (0.0094) (0.0052) (0.0119) (0.0130)
CAPINT -0.1081 *** -0.0687 *** -0.0393 *** -0.1865 *** -0.1579 *** -0.0286 ***
(0.0023) (0.0068) (0.0071) (0.0024) (0.0074) (0.0077)
INVINT -0.0969 *** -0.0443 *** -0.0526 *** -0.0198 *** -0.0583 *** 0.0385 ***
(0.0031) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0035) (0.0129) (0.0134)
STR 0.6209 *** 0.3090 *** 0.3116 *** 0.5128 *** 0.2548 *** 0.2580 **
(0.0287) (0.0896) (0.0940) (0.0362) (0.0034) (0.1220)
Constant 0.0152 0.1574 *** -0.1422 *** -0.0252 * 0.1384 *** -0.1636 ***
0.0123 0.0424 0.0441 0.0145 0.0491 0.0511
Country effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects included Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 135578 13303 124666 12330
F-stat 663.21 *** 72.13 *** 751.72 *** 75.26 ***
R
2
0.1535 0.1292 0.15807 0.1705
Public           
(N = 13303)
Private             
(N = 124666)
Public           
(N = 12330)
Private              
(N = 135578)
Dependent Variable
ETR2ETR1
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Table 7 
Tax haven operations and ETRs of private vs. public firms 
 
Note: ETR1 is the first effective tax rate measure calculated by dividing current tax expense by pre-tax income; ETR2 is the 
second effective tax rate measure calculated by dividing current tax expense by cash flow from operations. PRIVATE  is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is privately-held and 0 if a firm is publicly-listed; TAXHAVEN is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a tax-haven jurisdiction and 0 otherwise. We estimate 
Models 1 and 2 using the ordinary least square and weighted least square regressions, respectively. We include the same 
control variables as in Table 6. Country, sector and year fixed effects are also included in each specification. Sample period 
is between 2001and 2008, inclusive. For each variable, robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
PRIVATE 0.0232 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0207 *** 0.0027
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018)
TAXHAVEN -0.0177 *** -0.0212 *** -0.0177 *** -0.0145 ***
(0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0055)
PRIVATE*TAXHAVEN -0.0341 *** -0.0157 ** -0.0341 *** -0.0336 ***
(0.0074) (0.0080) (0.0074) (0.0059)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Country/Sector/Year effects yes yes yes yes
N 148881 136996 148881 136996
F-stat 674.9109 *** 689.82 *** 619.6735 *** 783.82 ***
R
2 0.149 0.148 0.135 0.1913
Model 2Model 1
ETR1 ETR2 ETR1 ETR2
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Table 8 
Home-country characteristics and ETRs of private vs. public firms 
 
Note: ETR1 is the first effective tax rate measure calculated by dividing current tax expense by pre-tax income; 
ETR2 is the second effective tax rate measure calculated by dividing current tax expense by cash flow from 
operations. WWTS is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a jurisdiction with a 
worldwide tax system and 0 otherwise; TTS is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is headquartered 
in a jurisdiction with a territorial tax system and 0 otherwise; TAXCONF is a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a jurisdiction whose financial reporting is closely linked with tax reporting and 
0 otherwise. PRIVATE  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is privately- held and 0 otherwise; 
TAXHAVEN is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a tax-haven jurisdiction 
and 0 otherwise. We include the same control variables as in Table 6. Country, sector and year fixed effects are 
also included in each specification. Sample period is between 2001and 2008, inclusive. For each variable, robust 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
Panel A: Home country tax system
WWTS
     PRIVATE 0.0405 *** 0.0221 ***
(0.0030) (0.0031)
     TAXHAVEN -0.0092 -0.0405 ***
(0.0109) (0.0099)
     PRIVATE*TAXHAVEN -0.0689 *** -0.0397 **
(0.0199) (0.0183)
TTS
     PRIVATE 0.0462 *** 0.0289 ***
(0.0019) (0.0021)
     TAXHAVEN -0.0228 *** -0.0138 ***
(0.0058) (0.0064)
     PRIVATE*TAXHAVEN -0.0327 *** -0.0201 ***
(0.0081) (0.0091)
Controls yes yes
Country/Sector/Year effects yes yes
N 148881 136996
 χ 2 1522.37 1877.05
Prob > χ 2 0.001 0.001
Panel B:Book-tax conformity
High TAXCONF
     PRIVATE 0.0619 *** 0.0378 ***
(0.0021) (0.0023)
     TAXHAVEN -0.0107 -0.0041
(0.0066) (0.0073)
     PRIVATE*TAXHAVEN -0.0504 *** -0.0197
(0.0115) (0.0130)
Low TAXCONF
     PRIVATE 0.0245 *** 0.0177 ***
(0.0024) (0.0026)
     TAXHAVEN -0.0304 *** -0.0079 ***
(0.0078) (0.0050)
     PRIVATE*TAXHAVEN -0.0227 ** -0.005
(0.0101) (0.0104)
Controls yes yes
Country/Sector/Year effects yes yes
N 148881 136996
 χ 2 1282.66 1877.05
Prob > χ 2 0.001 0.001
Dependent variables
ETR1                              ETR2
